Authenticated encryption schemes allow the signer to produce an encrypted message such that only the designated recipient can recover the message and validate its signature. To avoid a later dispute on the repudiation of the signature, we should equip the recipient with the ability for converting the signature into an ordinary one which can be verified by anyone. The scheme with the above capability is called a convertible authenticated encryption (CAE) scheme.
Introduction
After the introduction of public key and digital signature systems [1] [2] , it can be realized to exchange electronic documents satisfying the properties of confidentiality, integrity, authentication or non-repudiation. Consider the applications of credit cards. A consumer makes a transaction with his credit card such that his signature is usually verified by the bank rather than anyone else for the purpose of confidentiality [3] . A straightforward solution, traditionally, would be the so-called two-step approach [4] . That is, the signer first signs the message with his private key and then randomly chooses an encryption key to encrypt the message together with the corresponding signature. After that, the signer uses the recipient's public key to encrypt the encryption key and then transmits the ciphertexts to the specific recipient. Upon receiving the ciphertexts, the recipient first recovers the encryption key with his private key and then retrieves the message and its signature with the encryption key, and finally verifies the validity of the signature. Needless to say, the two-step approach is inefficient in terms of computation complexities and communication overheads.
In 1994, Horster et al. [5] proposed an authenticated encryption scheme which combines the functions of the digital signature and the public key encryption. As compared with traditional two-step approach, the authenticated encryption scheme obtains better performance in computation efficiency and communication cost. However, their scheme might counter some problems of a later dispute when the signer repudiates his signatures, e.g., the credit card user denies having generated a signature which is actually signed by himself. To convince the third party, such as the judge, of the signature originality, the recipient should release his private key to the third party. Under the circumstance, the private key can no longer be used and thus his public/private key pair shall be renewed again, which might make the system to be more difficult in practical implementations or to increase the operational cost.
In 1999, Araki et al. [6] proposed a convertible limited verifier signature scheme which equips the recipient with the ability to convert the signature into an ordinary one when the case of a later dispute occurs, yet their scheme could be questionable since it requires the signer to send one more parameters to fulfill the conversion. If the signer is unwilling to cooperate in the conversion phase, the recipient cannot produce an ordinary signature. In addition, the extra parameter and operations of the conversion process will increase both the computation and the communication overheads. Also note that their scheme is vulnerable to a universal forgery attack for any arbitrary chosen message [7] . To eliminate the above drawbacks, Wu and Hsu [8] proposed a convertible authenticated encryption (CAE) scheme in which the original signature is just embedded in the authenticated encryption message and the conversion process can be completed by the recipient solely without any computation efforts. In 2003, Huang and Chang [9] showed that an adversary can convert the authenticated encryption message into an ordinary signature by himself without the assistant of the signer if he knows the plaintext. However, the scenario proposed by Huang and Chang is unreasonable, since one basic requirement of Wu and Hsu's CAE scheme [8] is confidentiality with which the message cannot be revealed by the adversary.
Moreover, Huang and Chang's proposed improvement [9] is still vulnerable to their proposed attack. Hence, Wu and Hsu's CAE scheme is secure and we want to extend their scheme to propose generalized CAE schemes for smart card applications.
With the development of electronic commerce [10] [11] , smart cards [12] [13] [14] , which are also regarded as intelligent cards, play an important role in our daily life. Designed as small as credit cards, smart cards are convenient and portable devices equipped with slight processing power and some storage space. Without being authorized, one cannot access the sensitive data inside the smart card.
However, to equip smart cards with cryptographic functions, the computation complexity and memory space are concerned the most.
Koblitz [15] and Miller [16] first introduced the concept of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] which is especially attractive to the applications with limited computing power and insufficient storage space, e.g., smart cards. A main property of the ECC is that the key length is shorter than that of traditional cryptography under the same level of security, which helps faster execution and more bandwidth savings [23] [24] .
In this paper, we first propose a generalized CAE scheme based on discrete logarithms. Then, based on elliptic curve discrete logarithms, the generalized CAE scheme is modified for facilitating the gradually popular application of smart cards. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the Wu-Hsu CAE scheme and propose a generalized CAE scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem and its variants. The generalized CAE scheme based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and its variants are given in section 3. In the subsequent section, we have some discussions of our proposed schemes with respect to the performance and some security considerations. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
Wu-Hsu CAE Scheme and Generalized CAE Schemes Based on Discrete Logarithms
This section is separated into two parts. We first briefly review the Wu-Hsu CAE scheme and then present a generalized CAE scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem and its variants.
Brief Review of the Wu-Hsu CAE Scheme
Without loss of generality, the Wu-Hsu CAE scheme can be divided into two phases: the signing and verification, and the conversion phases. Initially, the system publishes the following parameters:
two large primes such that q | (p − 1);
g: a generator of order q over GF(p);
a one-way hash function.
Let each user U i own a private key x i and its corresponding public key . Details of each phase are described as below:
The signing and verification phase --To sign the message m with embedded redundancy, the signer U a first chooses an integer k ∈ and computes
Hence, (r 1 , r 2 , s) is the signature for m. Upon receiving the signature, the recipient U b can recover the message as 
Generalized CAE Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms
Based on the Wu-Hsu CAE scheme and the message recovery signature schemes [25] , we further propose a generalized CAE scheme, shorten to DL_GCAE scheme. The DL_GCAE scheme still preserves the merits of the Wu-Hsu CAE scheme, i.e., the conversion phase is rather simple and requires no computation efforts. The DL_GCAE scheme is also divided into two phases as those of the Wu-Hsu CAE scheme. Detailed descriptions of these two phases are given below.
The signing and verification phase --For a signing message m with embedded redundancy, the generated signature elements r 1 and r 2 are computed the same as Eqs. (1) and (2), while s can be replaced with the following equation
where (A, B, C) is the permutation of the parameters (± r 2 , ± s, ± 1). Consequently, the corresponding message recovery and signature verification equations are defined by the following equations, respectively:
We fix one combination of ± signs for each of the six permutations. Equations for computing the part s of the signature as shown in Table 1 . The corresponding equations for the message recovery and the signature verification are shown in Table 2 and 3, respectively. 
(8).
Proof:
The conversion phase --To deal with a later dispute on repudiation, the recipient U b can announce (m, s, r 2 ) to be verified by anyone else. By performing the corresponding equation in Table 3 , U b can prove the dishonesty of the signer.
Generalized CAE Scheme Based on Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms
Consider the properties of the devices with limited computing power and storage space (such as smart cards, mobile phones, and personal digital assistants (PDA), etc.), the computation complexity and memory space are concerned the most. For the proposed DL_GCAE scheme, it must use large key sizes for public key primitive to achieve a desirable security level. For example, we can use a prime of 2048 bits to secure data until around 2022 [26] . Computation complexity and storage size of the DL_GCAE scheme will grow quickly with the desired security level. Hence, the DL_GCAE scheme and the Wu-Hsu CAE scheme are unsuitable for such applications of devices with limited computing power and storage space.
An elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) of 160-bit modulus is as secure as a RSA or ElGamal systems of 1024-bit modulus [23, 24] . Hence, the ECC is efficient and suitable for such applications. So far, lots of researchers [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] have devoted themselves to the field of the ECC. Hence, based on the proposed DL_GCAE scheme and the ECC, we will propose a generalized CAE scheme (as ECDL_GCAE scheme for short) based on elliptic curve discrete logarithms for smart card applications.
The ECDL_GCAE scheme is also divided into two phases as those in section 2. Initially, the system publishes the following parameters: Eqs. (9) and (10), respectively. The part s of the signature is computed as Eq. (6) and six variants are shown in Table 1 .
Hence, (r 1 , r 2 , s) is the signature for m. To recover the message m, the recipient U b can perform the following equation:
and then verify its validity with the embedded redundancy. If the redundancy is valid, the recovered message m is the genuine message. Since (A, B, C) is the permutation of the parameters (± r 2 , ± s, ± 1), Table 4 lists six efficient variants corresponding to the variants as shown in Table 2 . The validity of the signature can be verified by the following equation: 
If it holds, the signature is valid. Table 5 lists six efficient variants corresponding to the variants as shown in Table 3 .
For the correctness of the message recovery and the signature verification of the proposed ECDL_GCAE scheme, we give the proofs as Theorems 3 and 4, respectively. Proof: 
Proof:
The conversion phase --To deal with a later dispute on repudiation, the recipient U b can announce (m, s, r 2 ) to be verified by anyone else. By performing the corresponding equation in Table 5 , U b can prove the dishonesty of the signer.
Performance and Security Analyses
In this section, we discuss the performance and some security considerations of our proposed schemes. The analyses of the DL_GCAE scheme and its variants based on discrete logarithms can be referred to those of the Wu-Hsu CAE scheme [8] for that they have the same structure. In the following, we put more emphases on the proposed ECDL_GCAE scheme and its variants, and have some detailed discussions.
Performance Analysis
To facilitate the analyses, we define the following notation. T EC_mul : the time for performing a modular multiplication computation over an elliptic curve.
We ignore the time for performing the modular addition because it is negligible as compared to computing time for performing other operations. Besides, the above various modular computations can be unitized into the same unit of modular multiplication computation as Table 6 [34]. The detailed computation costs of the variants of the proposed ECDL_GCAE scheme are shown as Table 7 . Table 6 . Conversion of modular multiplication computation
Security Analysis
The proposed ECDL_GCAE scheme and its variants are secure against potential attacks on condition that the one-way hash function (OWHF) [1, 35] and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) [20, 36, 37] are intractable.
We discuss the security considerations with respect to the requirements of confidentiality, unforgeability and non-repudiation [38] . 2 ) which is protected by the ECDLP and the OWHF assumptions.
Non-repudiation --When the signer denies having signed some signature, the specific recipient can release the converted signature (s, r 2 ). If the signature is actually signed by the signer, the verifier will be convinced since the converted signature satisfies the check of Eq. (12) with the signer's public key. That is, the signer can not repudiate the signature.
Conclusions
Convertible authenticated encryption schemes can provide the specific recipient with the ability to convert the authenticated encryption message into an ordinary signature and thus can prevent the signer from repudiating his signed signature. In the paper, we have proposed a generalized CAE scheme and its variants based on discrete logarithms. Furthermore, we adapt the scheme to a CAE scheme based on elliptic curve discrete logarithms for smart card applications and present corresponding variants. The proposed schemes are secure against active attacks and efficient for the signature conversion. Besides, based on elliptic curve discrete logarithms, the proposed scheme and its variants obtain crucial benefits for the applications of mobile devices like smart cards.
